導讀
8月28日，美聯儲主席凱文·沃什亮相傑克遜霍爾年會，發表題爲《我們所處的時代》（In Our Time）的演講。沃什談及美聯儲正在研究的若干長期議題，尤其聚焦人工智能（AI）及其可能給經濟帶來的變化，並反思關於“前瞻指引”的實踐以及央行與金融市場之間的互動關係，提出應當指導貨幣政策制定的幾項核心原則，也對當前經濟形勢作出判斷。市場認爲，此次沃什講話釋放出較爲鮮明的謹慎偏鷹信號。沃什認爲美國經濟和勞動力市場依然具有韌性，當前金融環境也很難稱得上具有明顯限制性，而通脹仍顯著高於美聯儲2%的目標，因此物價問題應繼續成爲貨幣政策的首要關注點。沃什尤其警惕由此形成的“鏡廳問題”——市場依據美聯儲指引定價，美聯儲又反過來參考市場價格作判斷，最終可能讓雙方同時忽視新的經濟變化。因而更傾向於減少事先承諾，讓市場形成自己的判斷。文章僅代表作者本人觀點。
一
爲未來的政策環境做好準備
謝謝大家。很高興再次來到這裏，見到這麼多熟悉的面孔。我一直期待着這個週末——還有什麼地方比這裏更適合紀念我出任主席的第100天呢？對於這裏熱情好客的款待，在座的各位都欠堪薩斯城聯邦儲備銀行行長傑夫·施密德及其同事們一份情。傑夫，感謝你們所有人。傑夫和其他策劃者爲今天晚些時候安排了一些娛樂活動。我建議大家在做選擇時要非常小心。
正如我多年前學到的，在傑克遜霍爾周圍的小徑上，你可以選擇兩種不同的徒步方式。我可以用兩個詞來總結我與前副主席唐·科恩一起徒步的經歷：我倖存下來了。這些如同鋼鐵馬拉松般的死亡行軍，揭示了我未曾預料到的唐的另一面。
還有另一種徒步方式——我將其與我的老同事本·伯南克主席聯繫在一起。和本在一起，節奏要悠閒得多，是在洛克菲勒保護區蜿蜒的小徑上輕鬆漫步。
所以，在出發之前，先做個體能狀況檢查，問問自己：“今天是科恩式的日子，還是伯南克式的日子？”
這次聚會最大的好處是，它幫助我們所有人理清思緒，清醒地思考我們的世界和我們的時代。對我來說，這感覺是正確的地點，也是正確的受衆，來真正探討那些最重要的想法。
創新是本次會議的主題，我相信公衆和市場——以其集體智慧——理解美聯儲在政策實施上的創新將有助於在實現充分就業的同時實現物價穩定。以下是我今天上午講話內容的快速概覽。你可以稱之爲大綱……你可以稱之爲路線圖……只是別稱之爲前瞻性指引。
首先，我將談及美聯儲正在就最新的通用技術——人工智能（AI）——及其可能將經濟帶向何方所提出的一些長期問題。
然後，我將對前瞻性指引的實踐以及央行與金融市場之間的互動進行一些反思。
接下來，我將提出一些我認爲應指導貨幣政策實施的關鍵原則。
最後，我將給出我對經濟的評估。爲未來的政策時點做準備。
在以不變的提頓山脈爲背景的這裏，我們所審視的經濟景象絕非靜止不動。
就在不久之前——在2008年危機爆發前夕以及隨後的十年裏——經濟學家和政策制定者還在談論長期停滯和全球儲蓄過剩。當時普遍認爲，過剩的資本將長期處於觀望狀態，因爲根本不會有足夠吸引人的投資機會。所有好東西都已被髮明出來了。因此，增長將是低速且緩慢的。
嗯，時代確實變了。我們正處在一個歷史的轉折點。
舉一個最明顯的例子，人工智能——這項有80年曆史的新技術名稱——的進展速度甚至比其倡導者一兩年前的預測還要快。
大幅提高增長的潛力正在上升。不斷擴大的資本池正湧入各類與人工智能相關的基礎設施。一種超摩爾定律似乎正在顯現。規模定律也在改變創新的方法和速度。
資本和勞動力相結合，創造了處於人工智能核心的大語言模型。用戶購買代幣以獲得對這些模型的訪問權。據報道，僅兩家領先實驗室的年化代幣銷售額就超過1000億美元——比一年前增長了500%以上。
美聯儲密切關注着這一切。我們認識到人工智能是一個新的變量——可能是一個新的生產要素——它將並對經濟和貨幣政策的實施都會產生影響。它開啓了一些重要的研究課題：
人工智能的應用是否會導致整個經濟體中生產力顯著、持續地上升？如果是，何時發生？
代幣的使用將與勞動力形成互補還是競爭？下一代人工智能模型是否會要求更大的資本密集度，還是模型本身會幫助設計出一種輕資本的解決方案？
其他未知因素還包括由此產生的市場結構。資本回報將落在何處，或在什麼時間框架內實現，這尚不明確。初期，多少盈餘會流向稀缺資產的所有者——人工智能實驗室、芯片製造商、能源生產商和雲服務提供商？隨着時間的推移，有多少價值會歸於企業和消費者？這對工人和美聯儲職責中的就業方面有何廣泛影響？
同樣，我們尚不清楚代幣的均衡價格。是否會出現代幣的異質性，以至於越來越多的資金將被用於購買前沿最佳模型的訪問權限？舊模型的代幣價格是否會降至其邊際成本的水平？
我們將在生產力與就業工作組的幫助下思考這些問題。我與該工作組及其他四個工作組的負責人進行的初步溝通令人鼓舞。
但需要明確的是，他們的建議將在之後提出，並且不會對我們當前政策時點的決策產生影響。但我相信，對於未來的政策挑戰，今天這種智力上的投資將使我們準備得更爲充分。
二
前瞻指引及其替代工具
在我們的工作組開展工作時，我並未坐等引入美聯儲的創新來使我們適應目標。舉一個例子，我已經開始着手改變美聯儲主席所謂前瞻性指引的形式和功能。你們可能知道我長期以來對未來政策決策的早期聲明感到不適。我更喜歡另一條路徑……並將爲之辯護。
關於未來政策決策溝通的透明度本身並非一種美德。溝通必須服務於美聯儲的首要責任：制定正確的貨幣政策。
前瞻性指引作爲一種常規做法，是我和我的同事在全球金融危機期間採用的。這在當時是必要的，我們大力推行了它。但是，正如過去危機留下的其他遺產一樣，我認爲這種做法已經過時了。
在正常時期，前瞻性指引的作用應是有限和受約束的。否則，它就有以清晰之名製造模糊的風險。過度分享政策審議和過度承諾未來決策，可能會誤導市場、企業和家庭。我相信，當政策制定者在整個週期內對利率做出準承諾時，我們會抑制自己在需要決策時做出正確判斷的自由。
要制定正確的政策，我們還需要處理好金融市場與央行之間的關係。美聯儲需要清晰的市場信號，儘可能未經過濾……來自市場內部……各類資產價格的水平與變化……國債的價格和交易量……美元的匯價……信貸的成本和可用性……以及廣泛大宗商品的價格。
這些及其他指標應在整個商業週期內爲美聯儲對經濟活動和通脹的短期展望提供信息。它們還應揭示更廣泛的金融狀況……以及金融週期中的風險和不確定性。
同時，市場參與者自身應追蹤整個經濟的真實信息。他們應得出自己的結論；形成自己對產出、就業和通脹的預期；並敏銳地關注風險。
美聯儲應保持謙遜，且永不天真。美聯儲在經濟和市場中扮演着至關重要的角色。我們的工具是強大的。我們決定了短期利率的路徑。市場參與者將始終試圖預測我們下一步的行動。但我們不應縱容一個市場參與者主要依賴美聯儲來決定其下一次交易的體制。
經濟學文獻早已描述了這種扭曲效應：一個鏡中奇境問題。如果市場嚴重依賴美聯儲的指導，而美聯儲又依賴市場價格，我們都更可能對新事態視而不見……更可能在事態轉折時措手不及……更可能在政策制定中犯錯。
具有諷刺意味的是，市場參與者不太可能承擔鏡中奇境問題的最大成本。最嚴重的危害很可能降臨到那些沒有金融資產的人身上。如果美聯儲錯誤判斷通脹和經濟，誰遭受最嚴重的後果？不是金融界的精英們。辛勤工作的美國人才要面對過高的通脹或突然顯得不那麼穩定的工作。
那麼，如果前瞻性指引不適合正常時期，那新美聯儲主席至少承諾一個明確的反應函數如何？當然，他應該告訴我們他的利率路徑——比如說，如果數據出現熱或冷的情況。
我希望我們對經濟的理解能精確到足以提供一個機械的、久經考驗的答案——像泰勒規則這樣的簡單函數可以被嚴格依賴。但我們的知識還遠未達到那個程度——至少現在還沒有——而且與貨幣政策正確實施最相關的因素會隨時間變化。
提供預測來說明美聯儲的反應函數，在理論上比實踐中更有效，在實驗室裏比在實際環境中更有效。不止我一個人注意到，舉一個例子，2021年的前瞻性指引很可能減緩了對高通脹的政策反應。
在我的主席任期內，我和我的同事們將努力構建更可靠的模型和更穩健的規則來指導政策決策。我們這樣做時也清楚，經濟預測的準確性仍只是一個願望。在地緣政治、全球供應鏈和技術變化如此之快的當下，對我們能知與未知保持謙遜是明智的。
本着同樣的精神，我們應接納可能爲美聯儲貨幣政策決策提供信息的各種想法。如果目標是優化決策，我們就不應排斥對經濟的各種觀點。那麼，如何規劃一條更好的政策路徑呢？在我餘下的講話中，我將分享一些指導我思考適當貨幣政策實施的關鍵原則……然後提供我承諾的對經濟的評估。
三
核心原則
接下來談談原則……
第一，我注意到，在這一行，昨天的新聞常常被誤認爲是當前正在發生的事情。挑戰在於辨別其中的差異。換言之，我們必須審視現實，以確保我們沒有基於過時或不準確的數據來制定前瞻性政策。我們也不應依賴孤立的數據點。趨勢最爲重要。美聯儲是一個決策機構。我們在不確定性中做出選擇，我們所依據的數據必須儘可能相關、及時、準確和可行。
第二，聯邦儲備的行動旨在確保經濟的總需求側與總供給大體一致。然而，我們直接觀察到的只是經濟活動。我們從未看到，只能推斷供給側真正發生了什麼。因此，評估總供給與總需求之間當前和預期的平衡是不精確的。
第三，不應有任何誤解：美聯儲以個人消費支出（PCE）價格指數衡量的2%的物價穩定目標，是一個堅定、固定的目標。讓我們同樣明確該目標的另一方面：價格穩定並非自動實現的，通脹也未必是均值迴歸的。實現穩定價格是美聯儲的工作。
第四，美聯儲也對實現最大就業負有責任。在中期內實現我們使命的雙重目標並非二選一的問題。我不認爲美聯儲的雙重使命是相互衝突的。畢竟，高通脹本身對經濟繁榮非常有害。
第五，短期利率是實現雙重使命的主要工具。旨在刺激經濟活動的非常規政策或許適用於真正的危機時刻，但在其他情況下應謹慎使用，甚至根本不用。
第六，貨幣很重要。這在當今並不流行，但我認爲貨幣與貨幣政策有着重要的關聯。我們應關注央行創造的貨幣以及來自銀行和金融體系的貨幣。誠然，金融創新和其他因素改變了連接貨幣基礎、貨幣流通速度和更廣泛經濟的機制。但這幾乎不是忽視貨幣最終對金融條件和價格影響的理由。
最後，一個更安靜、溝通更有針對性的美聯儲，更能夠實現其目標。我們可以爲實現我們的職責而接受問責——這是對我們信譽的真正考驗。借用查克·耶格爾將軍的一句話：“在關鍵時刻，要麼有理由，要麼有結果。“
四
當前經濟現狀
現在，基於這些原則，我如何看待當前的經濟？窗外到底發生了什麼？
你可能已經在七月份的會議紀要中看到了聯邦公開市場委員會的一致看法：勞動力市場穩定，產出穩健。但通脹仍然過高。我和我的大多數同事認爲，更明智的做法是在會議間歇期等待新的信息——特別是考慮到供應鏈、投資流和地緣政治可能的發展——然後再決定是否改變利率政策是明智的。我們並表示願意根據情況需要採取行動。
就我而言，今天我對經濟的整體表現印象深刻，它似乎已經走強。衡量經濟實力的一個指標是它抵禦衝擊的能力。在這一點上，主街和華爾街都表現出了非凡的韌性。
幾點觀察：
1、企業資本支出——未來經濟增長的種子——正在快速增長。設備和無形資產投資的四個季度變化約爲9%，爲2021年以來的最高增長率。今年超過一半的資本支出增長可能歸因於與人工智能相關的建設。
2、對於標準普爾500指數中的公司，過去一年利潤增長了超過20%。利潤率相對於歷史水平相當高。整體股票市場波動性較低。我們密切關注市場內部情況，觀察各板塊的表現。
3、對資本支出和企業盈利增長的預期都相當高。我將繼續關注其增長率的變化，即二階導數。對資產價格、商業信心、居民收入支出和消費的連鎖效應同樣重要。
4、公司債券和槓桿貸款的信用利差接近歷史區間的低端，這些市場的發行量今年以來一直相當強勁。放眼固定收益市場之外看銀行業務，在7月的高級貸款官意見調查中，銀行告訴我們，商業和工業貸款的標準處於其歷史區間的較松一端。這有助於解釋我們今年在這些貸款中看到的增長。信貸和貸款市場幾乎沒有顯示出政策約束的跡象。
5、某些行業——如住房和農業——正顯示出壓力。但總體而言。我很難將整體金融環境描述爲具有限制性。
6、儘管受到衝擊，實際消費者支出一直保持健康，在過去四個季度增長了超過2%。將消費與我們觀察到的活躍投資結合起來，私人國內最終購買（PDFP）也有所增長。今年到目前爲止，PDFP的增長速度接近3%。這個指標通常比國內生產總值包含更多信號，其趨勢也是積極的。
7、在美聯儲雙重使命的就業方面，我們國家做得很好。勞動力市場相當穩定。失業率爲4.1%，按歷史標準看仍然很低，且幾年來變化不大。以四周平均值計算的失業救濟金申請人數——一個經驗上穩健的實時指標——接近數十年來的最低水平。
8、在我看來，當今勞動力市場相對較低的週轉率，部分是疫情後環境中僱主與員工之間大規模重新匹配的結果。
9、當勞動力供應幾乎沒有增長時，月度就業增長自然會較低。勞動力市場總有令人擔憂的領域——例如，在應屆畢業生中。但總體而言，想要工作的人，大體上都在保留或找到工作。他們可能擔心未來潛在的勞動力中斷，但截至目前，我相信勞動力市場與充分就業是一致的。
但在我們使命的物價穩定方面，數據更令人擔憂。美聯儲偏好的通脹指標，即PCE價格指數的12個月變化率爲3.7%，而六個月變化率爲4.1%。消費者價格指數（CPI）的可比指標也處於高位，PCE和CPI通脹的核心指標也是如此。這些指標都不是完美的，但它們都講述了類似的故事：通脹運行在我們2%的目標之上。因此，美聯儲目前的主要焦點應該是物價。
政策制定者的工作是捕捉潛在的通脹趨勢——即經濟中普遍的、不受特殊因素影響的價格變動。我們要判斷潛在通脹是在上升、下降還是停滯。我們不僅要了解變動的方向，還要了解變動的速度。這些廣義通脹指標中的每一個都已從2022年的高點顯著下降。但過去兩年的進展是溫和的。
儘管今年夏天的PCE和CPI數據好於預期，但它並未告訴我潛在趨勢已顯著改善。
數據還顯示出溫和的工資增長。但在追蹤潛在通脹時，工資增長在很長一段時間內並未被證明是未來通脹的可靠指標。
爲了嘗試衡量潛在通脹，我發現將PCE價格指標的199個細分組成部分進行分解具有啓發性。在過去12個月中，PCE籃子中有54%的商品和服務的價格漲幅超過3%。這遠低於疫情後約77%的高點，但仍遠高於疫情前二十年32%的水平。
僅看過去六個月，結論類似：PCE籃子中有49%的商品和服務的年化價格漲幅超過3%。同樣，這遠低於疫情後的高點，但仍相當高。近期整體大宗商品價格的上漲也值得關注。我們需要判斷的是，這些趨勢是否表明通脹存在上行風險。
此外，過去五年多的通脹數據是否已滲透到預期中也很重要。好消息是，中期通脹預期的指標大體上看起來穩定。來自掉期市場的通脹補償指標也發出了強烈而相似的信息。
特別是鑑於近期的發展，市場價格的信心，即我們將實現物價穩定，這既是美聯儲作爲一個機構的榮譽，也符合美聯儲最好的傳統。我可以向你們保證……他們是對的。
在經濟史上，市場對通脹預期的衡量指標往往看起來強勁而持久，直到它們不再如此。這些預期不容易被動搖，目前它們被很好地錨定。但必須密切關注。確保通脹預期不會失錨是美聯儲的工作。
有一個信號誰都不能忽視：持續65個月的高通脹的責任完全在於央行。而且就該如此。
我的標準是：我們必須確信基礎通脹正在朝着我們的目標方向移動，而且是清晰且足夠快速地移動。否則，我們還有工作要做。那是我們的工作……我們的使命……我們肩負的重任。
五
結語
我今天站在這裏，致力於遵循一種紀律，而不是某一項決定。
我和我的美聯儲同事們絕非首次在如此重要的時刻擔任這些職位。我們決心通過盡最大努力做好工作來不負時光。
我們以謙遜和決心嚴肅對待我們的責任。如此之多的事情取決於我們所做的選擇。穩健的貨幣政策有助於家庭和企業繁榮。當有效執行時，它會拓寬和加深我們經濟的勢頭……並有助於確保美國在世界上的領導地位。我知道我們的國家需要我們深思熟慮並明智行事。能夠再次在聯邦儲備系統服務，是莫大的榮幸。我衷心感謝我的同事們……以及在這個房間裏的衆多人士給予我的鼓勵和寶貴建議。爲此，以及感謝大家今天上午的耐心聆聽，我謝謝各位。
原文節選：
1. Preparing for Future Policy Conjunctures
With the unchanging picture of the Tetons as our backdrop, we are here to survey an economic landscape that is anything but static.
It wasn’t so long ago—in the run-up to the crisis of 2008 and over the decade that followed—when economists and policymakers were speaking of secular stagnation and a global saving glut. It was a widely held view that an excess of capital would sit on the sidelines for a long, long time, because there just wouldn’t be enough compelling investment opportunities. All the good stuff had been invented. So growth would be low and slow.
Well, times sure have changed. We’ve come to a hinge point in history.
To cite the clearest example, progress in artificial intelligence—the 80-year-old name for the newest technology—has been faster even than its evangelists predicted a couple of years ago.
The potential for substantially higher growth is on the rise. Ever-expanding pools of capital are pouring into AI-related infrastructure of all sorts. A kind of hyper–Moore’s law seems to be playing out. Scaling laws, too, are changing both the method and speed of innovation.
Capital and labor have combined to create the large language models at the heart of AI. Users buy tokens to gain access to the models. Reports put annualized token sales for the two leading labs alone at more than $100 billion—an increase of 500-plus percent from a year ago.
The Fed watches all of this attentively. We recognize that AI is a new variable—potentially a new factor of production—that will have consequences for both the economy and the conduct of monetary policy. It opens some major lines of inquiry:
Will the application of AI cause a significant, sustained rise in productivity across the economy? And if so, when?
Will token usage be complementary or competitive to labor? Will the next generation of AI models demand even greater capital intensity, or will the models themselves help devise a capital-light solution?
Among the other yet unknowns is the resulting market structure. It’s not obvious where the returns on capital will land or on what timescale. Early on, how much of the surplus goes to owners of scarce assets—AI labs, chipmakers, energy producers, and cloud providers? Over time, how much of that value accrues to businesses and consumers? What are the broad implications for workers and for the employment side of the Fed’s mandate?
Likewise, we don’t yet know the equilibrium price of the tokens. Might there be a heterogeneity of tokens, such that growing sums will be paid for access to the best models at the frontier? Will token prices for older models fall to the level of their marginal cost?
We will be thinking through these matters with the help of a task force on productivity and jobs. My early check-ins with the leaders of that task force, and the four others, have been encouraging.
To be clear, though, their recommendations will come later and have no bearing on decisions we make in the current policy conjuncture. But I believe that for future policy challenges, this intellectual investment today will leave us far better prepared.
2. Forward Guidance and Its Stand-ins
As our task forces go about their work, I am not waiting to introduce innovations at the Fed to make us fit for purpose. To highlight one example, I have set out to change the form and function of the Fed Chairman’s so-called forward guidance. You might know about my long-time discomfort with early pronouncements of future policy decisions. I much prefer another path… and will make the case for it.
Transparency in communications about future policy decisions is not a virtue unto itself. Communications must be in service to the Fed’s paramount responsibility: getting monetary policy right.
Forward guidance as a regular practice was adopted by my colleagues and me during the Global Financial Crisis. It was essential at the time, and we introduced it with much fanfare. But, as with other legacies of crises past, I believe that the practice has overstayed its welcome.
In normal times, the role of forward guidance should be limited and circumscribed. Otherwise it risks creating ambiguity in the name of clarity. Oversharing policy deliberations and overcommitting to future decisions can lead markets, businesses, and households astray. And I believe when policymakers make quasi-commitments on interest rates through the cycle, we inhibit our own freedom to make the right calls when it’s time to decide.
To get policy right, we also need to get the relationship right between financial markets and the central bank. The Fed needs clear market signals, as unfiltered as possible… from market internals… the level and change in asset prices across sectors … the prices and trading volumes of Treasury securities… the foreign exchange value of the dollar … the cost and availability of credit… and the price of a broad set of commodities.
These and other indicators should inform the Fed’s near-term outlook on economic activity and inflation throughout the business cycle. They should also reveal the state of broader financial conditions …. and the risks and uncertainties in the financial cycle.
At the same time, market participants themselves should be tracking real information across the economy. They should draw their own conclusions; form their own expectations of output, employment, and inflation; and stay sharply attuned to risks.
The Fed should be humble and never naïve. The Fed plays an essential role in the economy and the markets. And our tools are powerful. We determine the path of short-term interest rates. And market participants will always try to anticipate what we will do next. But we should not indulge a regime in which market participants are looking primarily to the Fed for their next trade.
The economic literature has long described the distorting effects: a hall-of-mirrors problem. If markets rely materially on the Fed’s guidance and the Fed relies on market prices, we are all more likely to be blinded to new developments… more likely to be caught unprepared for a turn of events… and more likely to commit errors in policymaking.
Perversely, market participants are unlikely to bear the biggest costs of the hall-of-mirrors problem. The most serious harm is likely to befall those without financial assets. If the Fed gets inflation wrong and judges the economy wrong, who gets the worst of it? Not the financial high-fliers. Hard-working Americans are the ones left to deal with inflation that is too high or jobs that suddenly appear less secure.
So, if forward guidance is ill-suited to normal times, then how about the new Fed chief commits—at the very least—to an explicit reaction function? Surely, he should tell us his interest rate path—if, say, the data were to come in hot or cold.
I wish our understanding of the economy were so precise as to provide a mechanical, tried-and-true answer—that some simple function like a Taylor rule could be rigorously relied upon. But our knowledge just doesn’t extend that far—at least not yet—and the factors most relevant to the proper conduct of monetary policy change over time.
Providing forecasts to illustrate the Fed’s reaction function works better in theory than in practice, better in the lab than in the field. I’m not alone in noticing that forward guidance in 2021, to cite one example, might well have slowed the policy response to high inflation.
In my term as Chairman, my colleagues and I will endeavor to construct more reliable models and more robust rules to guide policy decisions. We’ll do this knowing that accuracy in economic forecasting is still just an aspiration. With so much changing so fast in geopolitics, global supply chains, and technology, it’s wise to be modest about what we can and cannot know.
In the same spirit, we should receive the full range of ideas on matters that may inform the Fed’s monetary policy decisions. If the aim is optimal decisionmaking, we should not crowd out views on the economy.
How, then, to chart a better path to policy? In the balance of my remarks, I will share some key principles that guide my thinking on the appropriate conduct of monetary policy… then offer my promised assessment of the economy.
3. Key Principles
Turning to principles …
First, I’ve noticed that, in this line of work, yesterday’s news has a way of getting mistaken for what is happening right now. The challenge is to know the difference. In other words, we must interrogate reality to make sure we are not setting forward-looking policy based on stale or inaccurate data. Nor should we rely on isolated data points. Trends matter most. The Fed is a decisionmaking agency. We make choices amid uncertainty, and the data upon which we draw must be as relevant, contemporaneous, accurate, and actionable as possible.
Second, the Federal Reserve’s actions are intended to ensure that the aggregate demand side of the economy is broadly consistent with aggregate supply. However, all we observe directly is activity. We never see, and can only infer, what’s really happening on the supply side. Hence, evaluating the current and expected balance between aggregate supply and demand is imprecise.
Third, there should be no misunderstanding: The Fed’s price-stability objective of 2 percent, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, is a firm, fixed target. Let’s be equally clear about another aspect of the objective: Price stability is not self-executing, nor is inflation necessarily mean-reverting. It is the Fed’s job to deliver stable prices.
Fourth, the Fed also bears responsibility for maximum employment. Achieving both sides of our mandate over the medium term is not an either/or proposition. I do not believe that the Fed’s dual mandate works at cross-purposes. After all, high inflation itself is very harmful to economic prosperity.
Fifth, short-term interest rates are the predominant tool to achieve the dual mandate. Unconventional policies to spur economic activity may suit genuine crises but should otherwise be used sparingly, if at all.
Sixth, money matters. It’s not fashionable these days, but my view is that money has something important to do with monetary policy. We should pay attention to money created by the central bank and money that comes from the banking and financial systems. It’s true that financial innovations and other factors alter the mechanics that link the monetary base, the velocity of money, and the broader economy. But that is scarcely a reason to ignore the ultimate effects of money on financial conditions and prices.
Finally, a quieter Fed, more purposeful in its communications, is better able to meet its objectives. And we can be held accountable for delivering on our remit—the only true test of our credibility. To borrow a line from General Chuck Yeager, “At the moment of truth, there are either reasons or results.”
- The Economy Today
Now, given these principles, how do I read the economy today? What’s really going on outside the window?
You may have read in the July minutes the unanimous view of the FOMC: Labor markets were stable, and output was solid. But inflation remained too high. A good majority of my colleagues and I thought the wiser course was to await new information in the intermeeting period—especially given possible developments in supply chains, investment flows, and geopolitics—before deciding whether a change in interest rate policy was advisable. And we expressed our joint readiness to act as circumstances might require.
For my part, today I am impressed by the overall performance of the economy, which appears to have strengthened. One indicator of strength is how well an economy holds up to shocks. On that score, both Main Street and Wall Street have been remarkably resilient.
Several observations:
Business capital expenditures—the seed corn of future economic growth—are rising rapidly. The four-quarter change in investment in equipment and intangibles has been around 9 percent, its highest growth rate since 2021. More than half of the cap-ex growth this year can likely be ascribed to the buildout related to AI.
For firms in the S&P 500, profits have grown by more than 20 percent over the past year. Profit margins are quite elevated, relative to history. Overall equity market volatility is low. We’re staying keenly focused on market internals, watching performance across sectors.
Expectations for growth in both cap-ex and corporate earnings are running quite high. I will continue to watch the change in their growth rates, the second derivative. The follow-on effects on asset prices, business confidence, consumer income, and spending are equally important to gauge.
Credit spreads on corporate bonds and leveraged loans are near the low ends of their historical ranges, and issuance volumes in these markets have been quite strong this year. Looking beyond fixed-income markets to the banking business, in the July Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, banks tell us that standards for commercial and industrial loans are on the easier end of their historical range. That helps explain the growth we’ve seen this year in those loans. Credit and loan markets are showing few signs of policy restraint.
Certain sectors—like housing and agriculture—are showing strains. But, on balance, I would be hard pressed to describe broad financial conditions as restrictive.
Real consumer spending has been healthy despite the shocks, increasing more than 2 percent over the past four quarters. Combining consumption with the brisk investment we’ve observed, private domestic final purchases (PDFP) has also risen. PDFP has increased at a pace of nearly 3 percent so far this calendar year. That’s a measure that typically carries more signal than gross domestic product, and the trend here too is positive.
On the employment side of the Fed’s dual mandate, our country is doing well. Labor markets are quite stable. The jobless rate, at 4.1 percent, remains low by historical standards and has not changed much for a couple of years. Unemployment claims, on a four-week average—an empirically robust real-time indicator—are near their lowest level in decades.
In my view, the relatively low turnover in today’s labor market is partly a result of the significant rematching between employers and employees that happened at scale in the post-pandemic environment.
When labor supply is barely growing, monthly job gains are naturally going to run low. There are always areas of concern in the labor market—for example, among recent graduates. In general, though, people who want to work, by and large, are holding or finding jobs. They may well be concerned about possible future labor disruptions, but as of now, I believe the labor markets are consistent with full employment.
But on the price-stability side of our mandate, the numbers are more concerning. The Fed’s preferred measure of inflation, the 12-month change in the PCE price index, stands at 3.7 percent, while the six-month change is 4.1 percent. The comparable measures from the consumer price index (CPI) are also elevated, as are the core measures of both PCE and CPI inflation. None of these measures are perfect, but they all tell a similar story: Inflation is running above our 2 percent target. So the Fed’s predominant focus right now should be on prices.
The job for policymakers is to capture underlying trend inflation—that is, the generalized change in prices in the economy, unaffected by idiosyncratic factors. We want to gauge whether underlying inflation is rising, falling, or stuck in place. We also want to understand not just the direction of travel, but also the speed. Each of these broad inflation measures has fallen significantly from their 2022 heights. But progress over the past two years has been modest.
And while this summer’s PCE and CPI readings were better than expected, they do not tell me that underlying trends have meaningfully improved.
The data also show moderate wage growth. But in tracking underlying inflation, wage growth has not proven a reliable indicator of future inflation for a very long time.
To try to gauge underlying inflation, I find it instructive to disaggregate the 199 individual components of the PCE price measure. Over the past 12 months, 54 percent of goods and services in the PCE basket showed price increases above 3 percent. This is well below the post-pandemic highs of about 77 percent, but it remains well above the level of 32 percent in the two decades that preceded the pandemic.
Looking over just the past six months, the conclusion is similar: Of goods and services in the PCE basket, 49 percent showed annualized price increases above 3 percent. Again, this is well below the post-pandemic highs but still quite elevated.
The recent rise in overall commodity prices also bears watching. What we need to judge is whether trends indicate upside inflation risks.
It matters, too, whether the inflation readings of the past five-plus years have seeped into expectations. The good news is that measures of inflation expectations in the medium term, by and large, look stable. And inflation compensation measures from the swaps market send a strong and similar message.
Especially in light of recent developments, it is a credit to the Fed as an institution—and consistent with the best of the Fed’s traditions—that market prices show confidence that we will deliver price stability. And I can assure you . . . they’re right.
The thing about market measures of inflation expectations in economic history is that they tend to look strong and durable until they don’t. Those expectations are not pushed around easily, and right now they are well anchored. But they must be closely minded. It’s the Fed’s job to make sure that inflation expectations do not get unanchored.
There is one signal nobody can miss: The responsibility for 65 months of sustained, elevated inflation sits squarely with the central bank. And that is where it belongs.
Here is my standard: We must be confident that underlying inflation is moving to our objective, clearly and at sufficient speed. Otherwise, we have work to do. That’s our job . . . our mandate . . . and our charge to keep.
- Conclusion
I stand here today committed to a discipline, not to a decision.
My Fed colleagues and I are hardly the first to hold these positions in a time of great consequence. We are determined to redeem the time by doing our very best work.
We take our responsibility seriously, with humility and with resolve. So much depends on choices we make. Sound monetary policy helps households and businesses to prosper. When carried out effectively, it broadens and deepens the momentum of our economy… and helps to secure America’s leadership in the world. And I know that our country needs us to think carefully and act wisely.
It is a tremendous honor to serve once again at the Federal Reserve. I am truly grateful for the encouragement and good counsel I’ve received from my colleagues… and from so many of you in this room. For that, and for your kind attention this morning, I thank you.
責任編輯：朱晨輝