导读
8月28日，美联储主席凯文·沃什亮相杰克逊霍尔年会，发表题为《我们所处的时代》（In Our Time）的演讲。沃什谈及美联储正在研究的若干长期议题，尤其聚焦人工智能（AI）及其可能给经济带来的变化，并反思关于“前瞻指引”的实践以及央行与金融市场之间的互动关系，提出应当指导货币政策制定的几项核心原则，也对当前经济形势作出判断。市场认为，此次沃什讲话释放出较为鲜明的谨慎偏鹰信号。沃什认为美国经济和劳动力市场依然具有韧性，当前金融环境也很难称得上具有明显限制性，而通胀仍显著高于美联储2%的目标，因此物价问题应继续成为货币政策的首要关注点。沃什尤其警惕由此形成的“镜厅问题”——市场依据美联储指引定价，美联储又反过来参考市场价格作判断，最终可能让双方同时忽视新的经济变化。因而更倾向于减少事先承诺，让市场形成自己的判断。文章仅代表作者本人观点。
一
为未来的政策环境做好准备
谢谢大家。很高兴再次来到这里，见到这么多熟悉的面孔。我一直期待着这个周末——还有什么地方比这里更适合纪念我出任主席的第100天呢？对于这里热情好客的款待，在座的各位都欠堪萨斯城联邦储备银行行长杰夫·施密德及其同事们一份情。杰夫，感谢你们所有人。杰夫和其他策划者为今天晚些时候安排了一些娱乐活动。我建议大家在做选择时要非常小心。
正如我多年前学到的，在杰克逊霍尔周围的小径上，你可以选择两种不同的徒步方式。我可以用两个词来总结我与前副主席唐·科恩一起徒步的经历：我幸存下来了。这些如同钢铁马拉松般的死亡行军，揭示了我未曾预料到的唐的另一面。
还有另一种徒步方式——我将其与我的老同事本·伯南克主席联系在一起。和本在一起，节奏要悠闲得多，是在洛克菲勒保护区蜿蜒的小径上轻松漫步。
所以，在出发之前，先做个体能状况检查，问问自己：“今天是科恩式的日子，还是伯南克式的日子？”
这次聚会最大的好处是，它帮助我们所有人理清思绪，清醒地思考我们的世界和我们的时代。对我来说，这感觉是正确的地点，也是正确的受众，来真正探讨那些最重要的想法。
创新是本次会议的主题，我相信公众和市场——以其集体智慧——理解美联储在政策实施上的创新将有助于在实现充分就业的同时实现物价稳定。以下是我今天上午讲话内容的快速概览。你可以称之为大纲……你可以称之为路线图……只是别称之为前瞻性指引。
首先，我将谈及美联储正在就最新的通用技术——人工智能（AI）——及其可能将经济带向何方所提出的一些长期问题。
然后，我将对前瞻性指引的实践以及央行与金融市场之间的互动进行一些反思。
接下来，我将提出一些我认为应指导货币政策实施的关键原则。
最后，我将给出我对经济的评估。为未来的政策时点做准备。
在以不变的提顿山脉为背景的这里，我们所审视的经济景象绝非静止不动。
就在不久之前——在2008年危机爆发前夕以及随后的十年里——经济学家和政策制定者还在谈论长期停滞和全球储蓄过剩。当时普遍认为，过剩的资本将长期处于观望状态，因为根本不会有足够吸引人的投资机会。所有好东西都已被发明出来了。因此，增长将是低速且缓慢的。
嗯，时代确实变了。我们正处在一个历史的转折点。
举一个最明显的例子，人工智能——这项有80年历史的新技术名称——的进展速度甚至比其倡导者一两年前的预测还要快。
大幅提高增长的潜力正在上升。不断扩大的资本池正涌入各类与人工智能相关的基础设施。一种超摩尔定律似乎正在显现。规模定律也在改变创新的方法和速度。
资本和劳动力相结合，创造了处于人工智能核心的大语言模型。用户购买代币以获得对这些模型的访问权。据报道，仅两家领先实验室的年化代币销售额就超过1000亿美元——比一年前增长了500%以上。
美联储密切关注着这一切。我们认识到人工智能是一个新的变量——可能是一个新的生产要素——它将并对经济和货币政策的实施都会产生影响。它开启了一些重要的研究课题：
人工智能的应用是否会导致整个经济体中生产力显著、持续地上升？如果是，何时发生？
代币的使用将与劳动力形成互补还是竞争？下一代人工智能模型是否会要求更大的资本密集度，还是模型本身会帮助设计出一种轻资本的解决方案？
其他未知因素还包括由此产生的市场结构。资本回报将落在何处，或在什么时间框架内实现，这尚不明确。初期，多少盈余会流向稀缺资产的所有者——人工智能实验室、芯片制造商、能源生产商和云服务提供商？随着时间的推移，有多少价值会归于企业和消费者？这对工人和美联储职责中的就业方面有何广泛影响？
同样，我们尚不清楚代币的均衡价格。是否会出现代币的异质性，以至于越来越多的资金将被用于购买前沿最佳模型的访问权限？旧模型的代币价格是否会降至其边际成本的水平？
我们将在生产力与就业工作组的帮助下思考这些问题。我与该工作组及其他四个工作组的负责人进行的初步沟通令人鼓舞。
但需要明确的是，他们的建议将在之后提出，并且不会对我们当前政策时点的决策产生影响。但我相信，对于未来的政策挑战，今天这种智力上的投资将使我们准备得更为充分。
二
前瞻指引及其替代工具
在我们的工作组开展工作时，我并未坐等引入美联储的创新来使我们适应目标。举一个例子，我已经开始着手改变美联储主席所谓前瞻性指引的形式和功能。你们可能知道我长期以来对未来政策决策的早期声明感到不适。我更喜欢另一条路径……并将为之辩护。
关于未来政策决策沟通的透明度本身并非一种美德。沟通必须服务于美联储的首要责任：制定正确的货币政策。
前瞻性指引作为一种常规做法，是我和我的同事在全球金融危机期间采用的。这在当时是必要的，我们大力推行了它。但是，正如过去危机留下的其他遗产一样，我认为这种做法已经过时了。
在正常时期，前瞻性指引的作用应是有限和受约束的。否则，它就有以清晰之名制造模糊的风险。过度分享政策审议和过度承诺未来决策，可能会误导市场、企业和家庭。我相信，当政策制定者在整个周期内对利率做出准承诺时，我们会抑制自己在需要决策时做出正确判断的自由。
要制定正确的政策，我们还需要处理好金融市场与央行之间的关系。美联储需要清晰的市场信号，尽可能未经过滤……来自市场内部……各类资产价格的水平与变化……国债的价格和交易量……美元的汇价……信贷的成本和可用性……以及广泛大宗商品的价格。
这些及其他指标应在整个商业周期内为美联储对经济活动和通胀的短期展望提供信息。它们还应揭示更广泛的金融状况……以及金融周期中的风险和不确定性。
同时，市场参与者自身应追踪整个经济的真实信息。他们应得出自己的结论；形成自己对产出、就业和通胀的预期；并敏锐地关注风险。
美联储应保持谦逊，且永不天真。美联储在经济和市场中扮演着至关重要的角色。我们的工具是强大的。我们决定了短期利率的路径。市场参与者将始终试图预测我们下一步的行动。但我们不应纵容一个市场参与者主要依赖美联储来决定其下一次交易的体制。
经济学文献早已描述了这种扭曲效应：一个镜中奇境问题。如果市场严重依赖美联储的指导，而美联储又依赖市场价格，我们都更可能对新事态视而不见……更可能在事态转折时措手不及……更可能在政策制定中犯错。
具有讽刺意味的是，市场参与者不太可能承担镜中奇境问题的最大成本。最严重的危害很可能降临到那些没有金融资产的人身上。如果美联储错误判断通胀和经济，谁遭受最严重的后果？不是金融界的精英们。辛勤工作的美国人才要面对过高的通胀或突然显得不那么稳定的工作。
那么，如果前瞻性指引不适合正常时期，那新美联储主席至少承诺一个明确的反应函数如何？当然，他应该告诉我们他的利率路径——比如说，如果数据出现热或冷的情况。
我希望我们对经济的理解能精确到足以提供一个机械的、久经考验的答案——像泰勒规则这样的简单函数可以被严格依赖。但我们的知识还远未达到那个程度——至少现在还没有——而且与货币政策正确实施最相关的因素会随时间变化。
提供预测来说明美联储的反应函数，在理论上比实践中更有效，在实验室里比在实际环境中更有效。不止我一个人注意到，举一个例子，2021年的前瞻性指引很可能减缓了对高通胀的政策反应。
在我的主席任期内，我和我的同事们将努力构建更可靠的模型和更稳健的规则来指导政策决策。我们这样做时也清楚，经济预测的准确性仍只是一个愿望。在地缘政治、全球供应链和技术变化如此之快的当下，对我们能知与未知保持谦逊是明智的。
本着同样的精神，我们应接纳可能为美联储货币政策决策提供信息的各种想法。如果目标是优化决策，我们就不应排斥对经济的各种观点。那么，如何规划一条更好的政策路径呢？在我余下的讲话中，我将分享一些指导我思考适当货币政策实施的关键原则……然后提供我承诺的对经济的评估。
三
核心原则
接下来谈谈原则……
第一，我注意到，在这一行，昨天的新闻常常被误认为是当前正在发生的事情。挑战在于辨别其中的差异。换言之，我们必须审视现实，以确保我们没有基于过时或不准确的数据来制定前瞻性政策。我们也不应依赖孤立的数据点。趋势最为重要。美联储是一个决策机构。我们在不确定性中做出选择，我们所依据的数据必须尽可能相关、及时、准确和可行。
第二，联邦储备的行动旨在确保经济的总需求侧与总供给大体一致。然而，我们直接观察到的只是经济活动。我们从未看到，只能推断供给侧真正发生了什么。因此，评估总供给与总需求之间当前和预期的平衡是不精确的。
第三，不应有任何误解：美联储以个人消费支出（PCE）价格指数衡量的2%的物价稳定目标，是一个坚定、固定的目标。让我们同样明确该目标的另一方面：价格稳定并非自动实现的，通胀也未必是均值回归的。实现稳定价格是美联储的工作。
第四，美联储也对实现最大就业负有责任。在中期内实现我们使命的双重目标并非二选一的问题。我不认为美联储的双重使命是相互冲突的。毕竟，高通胀本身对经济繁荣非常有害。
第五，短期利率是实现双重使命的主要工具。旨在刺激经济活动的非常规政策或许适用于真正的危机时刻，但在其他情况下应谨慎使用，甚至根本不用。
第六，货币很重要。这在当今并不流行，但我认为货币与货币政策有着重要的关联。我们应关注央行创造的货币以及来自银行和金融体系的货币。诚然，金融创新和其他因素改变了连接货币基础、货币流通速度和更广泛经济的机制。但这几乎不是忽视货币最终对金融条件和价格影响的理由。
最后，一个更安静、沟通更有针对性的美联储，更能够实现其目标。我们可以为实现我们的职责而接受问责——这是对我们信誉的真正考验。借用查克·耶格尔将军的一句话：“在关键时刻，要么有理由，要么有结果。“
四
当前经济现状
现在，基于这些原则，我如何看待当前的经济？窗外到底发生了什么？
你可能已经在七月份的会议纪要中看到了联邦公开市场委员会的一致看法：劳动力市场稳定，产出稳健。但通胀仍然过高。我和我的大多数同事认为，更明智的做法是在会议间歇期等待新的信息——特别是考虑到供应链、投资流和地缘政治可能的发展——然后再决定是否改变利率政策是明智的。我们并表示愿意根据情况需要采取行动。
就我而言，今天我对经济的整体表现印象深刻，它似乎已经走强。衡量经济实力的一个指标是它抵御冲击的能力。在这一点上，主街和华尔街都表现出了非凡的韧性。
几点观察：
1、企业资本支出——未来经济增长的种子——正在快速增长。设备和无形资产投资的四个季度变化约为9%，为2021年以来的最高增长率。今年超过一半的资本支出增长可能归因于与人工智能相关的建设。
2、对于标准普尔500指数中的公司，过去一年利润增长了超过20%。利润率相对于历史水平相当高。整体股票市场波动性较低。我们密切关注市场内部情况，观察各板块的表现。
3、对资本支出和企业盈利增长的预期都相当高。我将继续关注其增长率的变化，即二阶导数。对资产价格、商业信心、居民收入支出和消费的连锁效应同样重要。
4、公司债券和杠杆贷款的信用利差接近历史区间的低端，这些市场的发行量今年以来一直相当强劲。放眼固定收益市场之外看银行业务，在7月的高级贷款官意见调查中，银行告诉我们，商业和工业贷款的标准处于其历史区间的较松一端。这有助于解释我们今年在这些贷款中看到的增长。信贷和贷款市场几乎没有显示出政策约束的迹象。
5、某些行业——如住房和农业——正显示出压力。但总体而言。我很难将整体金融环境描述为具有限制性。
6、尽管受到冲击，实际消费者支出一直保持健康，在过去四个季度增长了超过2%。将消费与我们观察到的活跃投资结合起来，私人国内最终购买（PDFP）也有所增长。今年到目前为止，PDFP的增长速度接近3%。这个指标通常比国内生产总值包含更多信号，其趋势也是积极的。
7、在美联储双重使命的就业方面，我们国家做得很好。劳动力市场相当稳定。失业率为4.1%，按历史标准看仍然很低，且几年来变化不大。以四周平均值计算的失业救济金申请人数——一个经验上稳健的实时指标——接近数十年来的最低水平。
8、在我看来，当今劳动力市场相对较低的周转率，部分是疫情后环境中雇主与员工之间大规模重新匹配的结果。
9、当劳动力供应几乎没有增长时，月度就业增长自然会较低。劳动力市场总有令人担忧的领域——例如，在应届毕业生中。但总体而言，想要工作的人，大体上都在保留或找到工作。他们可能担心未来潜在的劳动力中断，但截至目前，我相信劳动力市场与充分就业是一致的。
但在我们使命的物价稳定方面，数据更令人担忧。美联储偏好的通胀指标，即PCE价格指数的12个月变化率为3.7%，而六个月变化率为4.1%。消费者价格指数（CPI）的可比指标也处于高位，PCE和CPI通胀的核心指标也是如此。这些指标都不是完美的，但它们都讲述了类似的故事：通胀运行在我们2%的目标之上。因此，美联储目前的主要焦点应该是物价。
政策制定者的工作是捕捉潜在的通胀趋势——即经济中普遍的、不受特殊因素影响的价格变动。我们要判断潜在通胀是在上升、下降还是停滞。我们不仅要了解变动的方向，还要了解变动的速度。这些广义通胀指标中的每一个都已从2022年的高点显著下降。但过去两年的进展是温和的。
尽管今年夏天的PCE和CPI数据好于预期，但它并未告诉我潜在趋势已显著改善。
数据还显示出温和的工资增长。但在追踪潜在通胀时，工资增长在很长一段时间内并未被证明是未来通胀的可靠指标。
为了尝试衡量潜在通胀，我发现将PCE价格指标的199个细分组成部分进行分解具有启发性。在过去12个月中，PCE篮子中有54%的商品和服务的价格涨幅超过3%。这远低于疫情后约77%的高点，但仍远高于疫情前二十年32%的水平。
仅看过去六个月，结论类似：PCE篮子中有49%的商品和服务的年化价格涨幅超过3%。同样，这远低于疫情后的高点，但仍相当高。近期整体大宗商品价格的上涨也值得关注。我们需要判断的是，这些趋势是否表明通胀存在上行风险。
此外，过去五年多的通胀数据是否已渗透到预期中也很重要。好消息是，中期通胀预期的指标大体上看起来稳定。来自掉期市场的通胀补偿指标也发出了强烈而相似的信息。
特别是鉴于近期的发展，市场价格的信心，即我们将实现物价稳定，这既是美联储作为一个机构的荣誉，也符合美联储最好的传统。我可以向你们保证……他们是对的。
在经济史上，市场对通胀预期的衡量指标往往看起来强劲而持久，直到它们不再如此。这些预期不容易被动摇，目前它们被很好地锚定。但必须密切关注。确保通胀预期不会失锚是美联储的工作。
有一个信号谁都不能忽视：持续65个月的高通胀的责任完全在于央行。而且就该如此。
我的标准是：我们必须确信基础通胀正在朝着我们的目标方向移动，而且是清晰且足够快速地移动。否则，我们还有工作要做。那是我们的工作……我们的使命……我们肩负的重任。
五
结语
我今天站在这里，致力于遵循一种纪律，而不是某一项决定。
我和我的美联储同事们绝非首次在如此重要的时刻担任这些职位。我们决心通过尽最大努力做好工作来不负时光。
我们以谦逊和决心严肃对待我们的责任。如此之多的事情取决于我们所做的选择。稳健的货币政策有助于家庭和企业繁荣。当有效执行时，它会拓宽和加深我们经济的势头……并有助于确保美国在世界上的领导地位。我知道我们的国家需要我们深思熟虑并明智行事。能够再次在联邦储备系统服务，是莫大的荣幸。我衷心感谢我的同事们……以及在这个房间里的众多人士给予我的鼓励和宝贵建议。为此，以及感谢大家今天上午的耐心聆听，我谢谢各位。
原文节选：
1. Preparing for Future Policy Conjunctures
With the unchanging picture of the Tetons as our backdrop, we are here to survey an economic landscape that is anything but static.
It wasn’t so long ago—in the run-up to the crisis of 2008 and over the decade that followed—when economists and policymakers were speaking of secular stagnation and a global saving glut. It was a widely held view that an excess of capital would sit on the sidelines for a long, long time, because there just wouldn’t be enough compelling investment opportunities. All the good stuff had been invented. So growth would be low and slow.
Well, times sure have changed. We’ve come to a hinge point in history.
To cite the clearest example, progress in artificial intelligence—the 80-year-old name for the newest technology—has been faster even than its evangelists predicted a couple of years ago.
The potential for substantially higher growth is on the rise. Ever-expanding pools of capital are pouring into AI-related infrastructure of all sorts. A kind of hyper–Moore’s law seems to be playing out. Scaling laws, too, are changing both the method and speed of innovation.
Capital and labor have combined to create the large language models at the heart of AI. Users buy tokens to gain access to the models. Reports put annualized token sales for the two leading labs alone at more than $100 billion—an increase of 500-plus percent from a year ago.
The Fed watches all of this attentively. We recognize that AI is a new variable—potentially a new factor of production—that will have consequences for both the economy and the conduct of monetary policy. It opens some major lines of inquiry:
Will the application of AI cause a significant, sustained rise in productivity across the economy? And if so, when?
Will token usage be complementary or competitive to labor? Will the next generation of AI models demand even greater capital intensity, or will the models themselves help devise a capital-light solution?
Among the other yet unknowns is the resulting market structure. It’s not obvious where the returns on capital will land or on what timescale. Early on, how much of the surplus goes to owners of scarce assets—AI labs, chipmakers, energy producers, and cloud providers? Over time, how much of that value accrues to businesses and consumers? What are the broad implications for workers and for the employment side of the Fed’s mandate?
Likewise, we don’t yet know the equilibrium price of the tokens. Might there be a heterogeneity of tokens, such that growing sums will be paid for access to the best models at the frontier? Will token prices for older models fall to the level of their marginal cost?
We will be thinking through these matters with the help of a task force on productivity and jobs. My early check-ins with the leaders of that task force, and the four others, have been encouraging.
To be clear, though, their recommendations will come later and have no bearing on decisions we make in the current policy conjuncture. But I believe that for future policy challenges, this intellectual investment today will leave us far better prepared.
2. Forward Guidance and Its Stand-ins
As our task forces go about their work, I am not waiting to introduce innovations at the Fed to make us fit for purpose. To highlight one example, I have set out to change the form and function of the Fed Chairman’s so-called forward guidance. You might know about my long-time discomfort with early pronouncements of future policy decisions. I much prefer another path… and will make the case for it.
Transparency in communications about future policy decisions is not a virtue unto itself. Communications must be in service to the Fed’s paramount responsibility: getting monetary policy right.
Forward guidance as a regular practice was adopted by my colleagues and me during the Global Financial Crisis. It was essential at the time, and we introduced it with much fanfare. But, as with other legacies of crises past, I believe that the practice has overstayed its welcome.
In normal times, the role of forward guidance should be limited and circumscribed. Otherwise it risks creating ambiguity in the name of clarity. Oversharing policy deliberations and overcommitting to future decisions can lead markets, businesses, and households astray. And I believe when policymakers make quasi-commitments on interest rates through the cycle, we inhibit our own freedom to make the right calls when it’s time to decide.
To get policy right, we also need to get the relationship right between financial markets and the central bank. The Fed needs clear market signals, as unfiltered as possible… from market internals… the level and change in asset prices across sectors … the prices and trading volumes of Treasury securities… the foreign exchange value of the dollar … the cost and availability of credit… and the price of a broad set of commodities.
These and other indicators should inform the Fed’s near-term outlook on economic activity and inflation throughout the business cycle. They should also reveal the state of broader financial conditions …. and the risks and uncertainties in the financial cycle.
At the same time, market participants themselves should be tracking real information across the economy. They should draw their own conclusions; form their own expectations of output, employment, and inflation; and stay sharply attuned to risks.
The Fed should be humble and never naïve. The Fed plays an essential role in the economy and the markets. And our tools are powerful. We determine the path of short-term interest rates. And market participants will always try to anticipate what we will do next. But we should not indulge a regime in which market participants are looking primarily to the Fed for their next trade.
The economic literature has long described the distorting effects: a hall-of-mirrors problem. If markets rely materially on the Fed’s guidance and the Fed relies on market prices, we are all more likely to be blinded to new developments… more likely to be caught unprepared for a turn of events… and more likely to commit errors in policymaking.
Perversely, market participants are unlikely to bear the biggest costs of the hall-of-mirrors problem. The most serious harm is likely to befall those without financial assets. If the Fed gets inflation wrong and judges the economy wrong, who gets the worst of it? Not the financial high-fliers. Hard-working Americans are the ones left to deal with inflation that is too high or jobs that suddenly appear less secure.
So, if forward guidance is ill-suited to normal times, then how about the new Fed chief commits—at the very least—to an explicit reaction function? Surely, he should tell us his interest rate path—if, say, the data were to come in hot or cold.
I wish our understanding of the economy were so precise as to provide a mechanical, tried-and-true answer—that some simple function like a Taylor rule could be rigorously relied upon. But our knowledge just doesn’t extend that far—at least not yet—and the factors most relevant to the proper conduct of monetary policy change over time.
Providing forecasts to illustrate the Fed’s reaction function works better in theory than in practice, better in the lab than in the field. I’m not alone in noticing that forward guidance in 2021, to cite one example, might well have slowed the policy response to high inflation.
In my term as Chairman, my colleagues and I will endeavor to construct more reliable models and more robust rules to guide policy decisions. We’ll do this knowing that accuracy in economic forecasting is still just an aspiration. With so much changing so fast in geopolitics, global supply chains, and technology, it’s wise to be modest about what we can and cannot know.
In the same spirit, we should receive the full range of ideas on matters that may inform the Fed’s monetary policy decisions. If the aim is optimal decisionmaking, we should not crowd out views on the economy.
How, then, to chart a better path to policy? In the balance of my remarks, I will share some key principles that guide my thinking on the appropriate conduct of monetary policy… then offer my promised assessment of the economy.
3. Key Principles
Turning to principles …
First, I’ve noticed that, in this line of work, yesterday’s news has a way of getting mistaken for what is happening right now. The challenge is to know the difference. In other words, we must interrogate reality to make sure we are not setting forward-looking policy based on stale or inaccurate data. Nor should we rely on isolated data points. Trends matter most. The Fed is a decisionmaking agency. We make choices amid uncertainty, and the data upon which we draw must be as relevant, contemporaneous, accurate, and actionable as possible.
Second, the Federal Reserve’s actions are intended to ensure that the aggregate demand side of the economy is broadly consistent with aggregate supply. However, all we observe directly is activity. We never see, and can only infer, what’s really happening on the supply side. Hence, evaluating the current and expected balance between aggregate supply and demand is imprecise.
Third, there should be no misunderstanding: The Fed’s price-stability objective of 2 percent, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, is a firm, fixed target. Let’s be equally clear about another aspect of the objective: Price stability is not self-executing, nor is inflation necessarily mean-reverting. It is the Fed’s job to deliver stable prices.
Fourth, the Fed also bears responsibility for maximum employment. Achieving both sides of our mandate over the medium term is not an either/or proposition. I do not believe that the Fed’s dual mandate works at cross-purposes. After all, high inflation itself is very harmful to economic prosperity.
Fifth, short-term interest rates are the predominant tool to achieve the dual mandate. Unconventional policies to spur economic activity may suit genuine crises but should otherwise be used sparingly, if at all.
Sixth, money matters. It’s not fashionable these days, but my view is that money has something important to do with monetary policy. We should pay attention to money created by the central bank and money that comes from the banking and financial systems. It’s true that financial innovations and other factors alter the mechanics that link the monetary base, the velocity of money, and the broader economy. But that is scarcely a reason to ignore the ultimate effects of money on financial conditions and prices.
Finally, a quieter Fed, more purposeful in its communications, is better able to meet its objectives. And we can be held accountable for delivering on our remit—the only true test of our credibility. To borrow a line from General Chuck Yeager, “At the moment of truth, there are either reasons or results.”
- The Economy Today
Now, given these principles, how do I read the economy today? What’s really going on outside the window?
You may have read in the July minutes the unanimous view of the FOMC: Labor markets were stable, and output was solid. But inflation remained too high. A good majority of my colleagues and I thought the wiser course was to await new information in the intermeeting period—especially given possible developments in supply chains, investment flows, and geopolitics—before deciding whether a change in interest rate policy was advisable. And we expressed our joint readiness to act as circumstances might require.
For my part, today I am impressed by the overall performance of the economy, which appears to have strengthened. One indicator of strength is how well an economy holds up to shocks. On that score, both Main Street and Wall Street have been remarkably resilient.
Several observations:
Business capital expenditures—the seed corn of future economic growth—are rising rapidly. The four-quarter change in investment in equipment and intangibles has been around 9 percent, its highest growth rate since 2021. More than half of the cap-ex growth this year can likely be ascribed to the buildout related to AI.
For firms in the S&P 500, profits have grown by more than 20 percent over the past year. Profit margins are quite elevated, relative to history. Overall equity market volatility is low. We’re staying keenly focused on market internals, watching performance across sectors.
Expectations for growth in both cap-ex and corporate earnings are running quite high. I will continue to watch the change in their growth rates, the second derivative. The follow-on effects on asset prices, business confidence, consumer income, and spending are equally important to gauge.
Credit spreads on corporate bonds and leveraged loans are near the low ends of their historical ranges, and issuance volumes in these markets have been quite strong this year. Looking beyond fixed-income markets to the banking business, in the July Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, banks tell us that standards for commercial and industrial loans are on the easier end of their historical range. That helps explain the growth we’ve seen this year in those loans. Credit and loan markets are showing few signs of policy restraint.
Certain sectors—like housing and agriculture—are showing strains. But, on balance, I would be hard pressed to describe broad financial conditions as restrictive.
Real consumer spending has been healthy despite the shocks, increasing more than 2 percent over the past four quarters. Combining consumption with the brisk investment we’ve observed, private domestic final purchases (PDFP) has also risen. PDFP has increased at a pace of nearly 3 percent so far this calendar year. That’s a measure that typically carries more signal than gross domestic product, and the trend here too is positive.
On the employment side of the Fed’s dual mandate, our country is doing well. Labor markets are quite stable. The jobless rate, at 4.1 percent, remains low by historical standards and has not changed much for a couple of years. Unemployment claims, on a four-week average—an empirically robust real-time indicator—are near their lowest level in decades.
In my view, the relatively low turnover in today’s labor market is partly a result of the significant rematching between employers and employees that happened at scale in the post-pandemic environment.
When labor supply is barely growing, monthly job gains are naturally going to run low. There are always areas of concern in the labor market—for example, among recent graduates. In general, though, people who want to work, by and large, are holding or finding jobs. They may well be concerned about possible future labor disruptions, but as of now, I believe the labor markets are consistent with full employment.
But on the price-stability side of our mandate, the numbers are more concerning. The Fed’s preferred measure of inflation, the 12-month change in the PCE price index, stands at 3.7 percent, while the six-month change is 4.1 percent. The comparable measures from the consumer price index (CPI) are also elevated, as are the core measures of both PCE and CPI inflation. None of these measures are perfect, but they all tell a similar story: Inflation is running above our 2 percent target. So the Fed’s predominant focus right now should be on prices.
The job for policymakers is to capture underlying trend inflation—that is, the generalized change in prices in the economy, unaffected by idiosyncratic factors. We want to gauge whether underlying inflation is rising, falling, or stuck in place. We also want to understand not just the direction of travel, but also the speed. Each of these broad inflation measures has fallen significantly from their 2022 heights. But progress over the past two years has been modest.
And while this summer’s PCE and CPI readings were better than expected, they do not tell me that underlying trends have meaningfully improved.
The data also show moderate wage growth. But in tracking underlying inflation, wage growth has not proven a reliable indicator of future inflation for a very long time.
To try to gauge underlying inflation, I find it instructive to disaggregate the 199 individual components of the PCE price measure. Over the past 12 months, 54 percent of goods and services in the PCE basket showed price increases above 3 percent. This is well below the post-pandemic highs of about 77 percent, but it remains well above the level of 32 percent in the two decades that preceded the pandemic.
Looking over just the past six months, the conclusion is similar: Of goods and services in the PCE basket, 49 percent showed annualized price increases above 3 percent. Again, this is well below the post-pandemic highs but still quite elevated.
The recent rise in overall commodity prices also bears watching. What we need to judge is whether trends indicate upside inflation risks.
It matters, too, whether the inflation readings of the past five-plus years have seeped into expectations. The good news is that measures of inflation expectations in the medium term, by and large, look stable. And inflation compensation measures from the swaps market send a strong and similar message.
Especially in light of recent developments, it is a credit to the Fed as an institution—and consistent with the best of the Fed’s traditions—that market prices show confidence that we will deliver price stability. And I can assure you . . . they’re right.
The thing about market measures of inflation expectations in economic history is that they tend to look strong and durable until they don’t. Those expectations are not pushed around easily, and right now they are well anchored. But they must be closely minded. It’s the Fed’s job to make sure that inflation expectations do not get unanchored.
There is one signal nobody can miss: The responsibility for 65 months of sustained, elevated inflation sits squarely with the central bank. And that is where it belongs.
Here is my standard: We must be confident that underlying inflation is moving to our objective, clearly and at sufficient speed. Otherwise, we have work to do. That’s our job . . . our mandate . . . and our charge to keep.
- Conclusion
I stand here today committed to a discipline, not to a decision.
My Fed colleagues and I are hardly the first to hold these positions in a time of great consequence. We are determined to redeem the time by doing our very best work.
We take our responsibility seriously, with humility and with resolve. So much depends on choices we make. Sound monetary policy helps households and businesses to prosper. When carried out effectively, it broadens and deepens the momentum of our economy… and helps to secure America’s leadership in the world. And I know that our country needs us to think carefully and act wisely.
It is a tremendous honor to serve once again at the Federal Reserve. I am truly grateful for the encouragement and good counsel I’ve received from my colleagues… and from so many of you in this room. For that, and for your kind attention this morning, I thank you.
责任编辑：朱晨辉